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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Intergenerational mobility varies not just across countries, but also within them – be it across 
geographic, ethnic or family lines. What then drives the exceptional mobility of children from some 
backgrounds but not others? To what extent do such differences reflect differences in abilities, in 
economic and institutional factors, or in beliefs and preferences that may be specific to a community’s 
culture or social context? 
I study these questions looking at second-generation migrants in Australia. The mobility of migrants is 
of interest in its own right, but may also shed light on the potential role of some of these drivers of 
mobility in the community at large. 
I present a new decomposition of intergenerational income mobility into education mobility and the 
returns to education in both generations. Intuitively, a migrant community may have a higher income 
in the second generation than might be expected based on the first generation for one of three reasons. 
First, the first generation could have earned a relatively low return to education and their income may 
thus be a poor reflection of what they pass on to their children. Second, the second generation could 
be more upwardly mobile in education.  Third, the second generation could earn a relatively high return 
to education.  
I find differences in education mobility, rather than the returns to education, are central to differences 
in income mobility between migrant communities. However, the decomposition varies significantly by 
source region. Further, the mobility of migrant communities is relatively persistent by source country 
over a thirty-year period, despite profound changes in the Australian community over that time.  
The importance of education and persistence of mobility motivates the remainder of the paper. What 
do migrant communities share that drives success or otherwise? I find evidence suggesting that both the 
culture migrants bring with them and the social context they enter plays a role.   
Second generation Australians from countries that outperform on tests of student achievement also 
outperform, on average, in Australia. This association remains apparent when controlling for family, 
peer and school characteristics. This suggests a potential role for educational culture – something 
migrants may potentially share with those they leave behind – in driving educational mobility.  
Further, second generation Australians get more education if the first generation faces a higher income 
penalty relative to similarly educated natives. This association only emerges late in adolescence, and 
is reflected in educational aspirations and the perceived value of education, but not in test scores. This 
suggests migrant communities that faced higher income penalties in the first generation may place 
greater importance on educational attainment, which ultimately flows through to second-generation 
outcomes. 
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ABSTRACT 
I explore the role of education, culture and social context in the intergenerational income 
mobility of second generation migrant communities in Australia. I present a new 
decomposition of intergenerational income mobility, and find a central role for 
differences in education mobility in driving differences in income mobility between 
migrant communities. Further, differences in the cultural values migrant communities 
bring with them, and the context of their migration, are associated with large differences 
in second generation educational achievement and attainment. Second generation 
migrants from countries that outperform on tests of student achievement, or face higher 
income penalties in the first generation, tend to have better educational outcomes. I use 
a rich array of survey and test score data to show the outperformance of migrants from 
poorer backgrounds emerges late in adolescence, and is reflected in attainment, 
aspirations and the perceived returns to education, but not in school test scores. 
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational relationships in outcomes within a country often mask considerable heterogeneity
— be it across geographic, ethnic or family lines. What then drives some children to succeed while
others struggle? What role do differences in abilities, in economic and institutional factors, or in
beliefs and preferences that may be specific to a community’s culture or social context play? These
questions are particularly salient in considering the intergenerational mobility of migrants. Migrants
are both socially and economically important in many advanced economies, making the outcomes of
the second generation an issue of much interest. They are also a group where variation in some of
these factors may be more pronounced or more plausibly isolated than in the broader community.1
I make two main contributions to the literature on the intergenerational mobility of migrants
(see Sweetman and van Ours (2015) for a recent survey). First, I present a decomposition of inter-
generational income mobility, and use it to shed light on the potential drivers of second generation
outcomes across a large set of source countries. Second, I examine the drivers of educational suc-
cess, using an array of individual-level data tracking test scores, aspirations and attainment through
adolescence and into adulthood. The Australian setting is ideal due to its large, diverse and long-
standing migrant population providing significant variation — both across source countries and over
time — and ability to precisely identify and link migrant generations in a wide variety of census,
test score and survey data.
I begin with group-level data linking generations of migrants across Australian Censuses. Similar
approaches have been used to examine the intergenerational mobility of migrants in the United
States and Canada (Borjas (1993); Card et al. (2000); Aydemir et al. (2009)). I develop a simple
decomposition of the residual from a standard intergenerational income mobility regression into
residuals from underlying regressions representing education mobility, and the returns to education
in both generations. In this framework, exceptional income mobility will reflect some combination of:
the unwinding of particularly low or high returns to education for the first generation; exceptional
education mobility; or particularly low or high returns to education in the second generation. All
three channels are plausible, and have some support in the existing literature. The advantage of
this decomposition is that it allows all three to be considered alongside one another. Further,
1There is a long tradition in economics of using the experiences of migrants to shine a light on the role of factors
that may be more difficult to observe in the broader community. For example, migrants have been used to study the
role of networks in job search (Munshi (2003)), and culture in female labour force participation and fertility decisions
(Fernandez and Fogli (2009)).
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the decomposition is allowed to differ across migrant communities, rather than averaging across
potentially diverse experiences.
I find a central role for differences in education mobility in driving differences in income mobil-
ity between migrant communities. In particular, the upward income mobility of Asian Australians
is mostly accounted for by their upward educational mobility. However, the decomposition varies
greatly by source country and region. Lower second generation returns to education play an impor-
tant role in the mobility of Middle Eastern and South American Australians. And the unwinding of
particularly high and low first generation returns for migrants from the United Kingdom and Main-
land South East Asia respectively influence the observed mobility of the second generation. Finally,
the mobility of migrant communities is relatively persistent by source country over a thirty-year
period, despite significant changes in policy over this period.
The importance of education and persistence of source country effects motivates the remainder
of the paper. What persistent factors do migrant communities share that influence outcomes — does
culture play a role? To examine the potential role of culture, I adopt the ‘epidemiological approach’
from the broader literature on culture and economics (Ferna´ndez (2011)).2 The approach hinges
on the idea that migrants may more readily bring their culture with them than their economic and
institutional environment. Central to the approach is the use of a quantitative proxy for the outcome
in question. I use a source country’s performance on the Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA), adjusted for their income level. In the source country, PISA performance
reflects the decisions and investments of individual families and children, and broader economic and
institutional settings, such as the quality of the education system. Performance will thus capture an
element of cultural attitudes towards education.3 If this proxy has explanatory power over second
generation Australians, born and educated in Australia, it likely reflects the influence of cultural
traits that migrants bring with them, rather than the environment they leave behind.4
Of course, migrant communities share more than just their culture — they also share the expe-
rience of migration and integration itself. In particular, a large body of research has examined the
origins and evolution of the wage gap between migrants and similarly skilled natives.5 Motivated
2While culture is a difficult concept to define, in this context it is best thought of as systematic variation in beliefs
and preferences across source countries. This definition is borrowed from Ferna´ndez (2011).
3Indeed, cross-country studies of the influence of education policies on test scores work hard to exclude cultural
factors as a potential omitted variable driving their conclusions (Hanushek and Woessmann (2011)).
4Naturally, migrants may choose to settle in locations and schools that resemble the economic and institutional
environment in their source country. I thus test the robustness of my results to the inclusion of controls that attempt
to account for the fact that migrants may take some of their environment with them.
5For example, Chiswick (1978); Borjas (1985); Borjas et al. (1987); Lubotsky (2007).
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by this, I use the income gap between first generation migrants and similarly educated natives as
a proxy for the context of migration. This may capture many relevant features of the migration
experience, such as the factors motivating migration, and the adjustment costs faced on arrival.
I find sizeable and statistically significant associations between these cultural and contextual
proxies and second generation education. Being born to a father from a source country that is a
full standard deviation higher in the PISA outperformance measure — roughly the gap between
Vietnam and New Zealand, or New Zealand and Lebanon — is associated with an additional 0.5
years of education. Being born to a father from a community facing an income penalty that is
10 percentile rank points higher — roughly the gap between Vietnam and Greece, or Greece and
England — is associated with an additional 0.3 years of education.
The fact that a higher income penalty is positively associated with second generation success is
potentially surprising. Ordinarily we might expect the opposite — higher incomes may relax financial
constraints to investing in education, or may indicate higher unobserved ability or other advantages
that may be shared with the second generation, such as geography or a lack of discrimination. But
there are also multiple credible mechanisms running in the other direction. For example, it may be
first generation migrants who face higher income penalties are more likely to have migrated due to
altruistic concerns, and thus also invest more in their children. Alternatively, they may come from
countries where educational opportunities were limited, and hence parents may possess and pass on
to their children higher unobserved ability.
I shed light on these mechanisms using rich test and survey data. In particular, I show the
association between a higher income penalty and success is likely driven by aspirations rather than
ability or parental investments that pay early dividends — the association is relatively weak when
looking at test scores at age 15, but strong when looking at educational attainment. Further,
those from communities with higher income penalties plan on more education, and see it as more
important to ‘getting ahead’. The results are consistent with a world in which individuals face the
same constraints as econometricians (at least) in determining the true return to education (Manski
(1993)) and form their expectations based on the world they see around them. In this sense, a
higher income penalty in the first generation could influence expectations, aspirations and subsequent
attainment. That said, it may also be that parental altruism or other pre-migration differences, as
proxied for by the income penalty, only reveal themselves late in the second generation.
Omitted variables are the key constraint on any causal interpretation of the results. I address
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these concerns in a variety of ways that make the case for a causal interpretation more compelling.
First, the cultural and contextual proxies retain their explanatory power when controlling for other
explanations for ‘ethnic capital’, such as more traditional human capital externalities (as in Borjas
(1992)) or community size (as in Gang and Zimmermann (2000)). Both proxies remain important
in the survey and test score data where precise controls for an individual’s family background
and institutional setting can be included. PISA outperformance appears most strongly associated
with similar measures of student achievement, while the income penalty is most strongly associated
with eventual educational attainment. Finally, both these associations remain when estimation is
restricted to within source regions, rather than drawing on variation between them. This latter test
exploits a key advantage of the Australian setting and data — a large, diverse and longstanding
migrant population that allows variation within source regions and over time to be exploited. While
the selectiveness and composition of migrants differs dramatically across nations, the patterns of
source country effects is often similar (Sweetman and van Ours (2015)), and the results presented
here thus offer insights that may apply beyond the Australian setting.
2 Related literature
Migrants and their recent descendants are a large and growing share of the population of the devel-
oped economies (Sweetman and van Ours (2015)). Their outcomes have an important bearing on
destination countries, and of course the wellbeing of the individuals concerned. Unsurprisingly then
there is a large body of work on the intergenerational mobility of migrants.
Much of the literature on the intergenerational mobility of migrants considers the general degree
of persistence in the economic status of migrant communities, relative to that observed in the
population as a whole. In pioneering work, Borjas found higher levels of persistence among migrant
communities, with the outcomes for an individual reflecting not just those of their parents, but those
of their parents’ ethnic group (Borjas (1992, 1993)). Borjas noted that multiple mechanisms could
underlie this ‘ethnic capital’. There have been many subsequent studies of the mobility of migrants
and on the outcomes of second generation migrants in general (Sweetman and van Ours (2015)).6 A
common observation is that the migrant source country matters — and this is a focus of this paper.
6For example, migrant mobility papers have reexamined the United States (Card et al. (2000)), including during
the age of mass migration (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Ward (2017)), but also investigated Canada (Aydemir et al.
(2009, 2013)) and Sweden (Hammarstedt and Palme (2012)).
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Why do some migrant communities do particularly well, or not?
A number of existing studies have examined the outcomes of second generation Australians. Khoo
et al. (2002) compares outcomes for second generation Australians by source country — however,
data limitations prevent them from exploring the what lies behind the diversity of second gener-
ation outcomes. More recent studies have looked at specific aspects of second generation success.
For example, Messinis (2009) examines the role of language and job mismatch in second generation
earnings. Cobb-Clark and Nguyen (2012) find that young Australians from non-English-speaking
background immigrant families have an educational advantage over English-speaking background
and Australian-born peers, which largely stems from differences in outcomes between those with
similar family backgrounds. Lastly, the performance of the second generation on PISA and other
educational outcomes, including the success of Asian Australians and explanatory power of be-
haviours and cultural traits, has also been examined (Marks (2010); Mendez (2015)).
Finally, this paper can be seen in the context of a rapidly growing literature on intergenerational
mobility more generally. Recent contributions have highlighted significant heterogeneity within
nations across regional and racial groupings.7 Such findings complement a more longstanding obser-
vation from sibling correlation studies of heterogeneity across families — much of the effect of family
on a child’s eventual income is transmitted through mechanisms uncorrelated with family income
itself (Black and Devereux (2011)).8 This paper helps shine a light on some such mechanisms.
3 Data
I use a mix of full population census data, and detailed test and survey data, drawing on the relative
strengths of each in the analysis. The census data allows the intergenerational mobility of migrants
to analysed at a group-level for the largest possible set of communities, as even small migrant
communities are captured.9 The survey data misses some of the smaller communities, but allows a
7For example, geographic variation in intergenerational mobility in the United States (Chetty et al. (2014)), Italy
(Gu¨ell et al. (2018); Acciari et al. (2016)) and Australia (Deutscher and Mazumder (unpublished)). Differences by race
in America are also well established (e.g. Hertz (2008); Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011); Chetty et al. (2018)).
8A few studies of sibling correlations have shone a light on transmission mechanisms for family fixed effects by
examining the extent to which correlations can be explained by child or parent characteristics. For example, Mazumder
(2008) finds up to half the brother correlation in the United States can be accounted for by their educational attainment
and test scores, while Bjo¨rklund et al. (2010) find a similar level of explanatory power in indicators of parenting
practices and attitudes. This paper complements those studies, finding education is pivotal to migrant mobility and
pointing to a role for culture and social context.
9Previous studies have typically relied on samples, rather than full population counts, of census data. For example,
Borjas (1993) uses 1-2% sample files from the United States Census while Aydemir et al. (2009) use 20% sample files
from the Canadian Census. Full counts allow even small migrant communities to be studied, increasing variation
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much richer analysis of outcomes and set of controls.
3.1 Full population Census data
I use customised tabulations from the full unit record files of eight Australian Censuses of Population
and Housing. The Australian Census is well placed to examine questions relating to the intergener-
ational mobility of migrants. Australia has a large and diverse migrant population, and five-yearly
censuses have routinely collected information on the income, educational attainment, and own and
parent country of birth of the full population.
3.1.1 Second generation sample and outcomes
The 2016 Census is my primary source of information on the second generation, as it is the first
since 1996 to ask for parent country of birth.10 I begin by grouping all Australian-born individuals
by intercensal birth cohorts (c) and male parent country of birth (o). I focus on six birth cohorts
(those born prior to the 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991 Censuses) and 76 country groupings
(75 countries, including Australia, and an other grouping).11 This results in 456 possible second
generation ‘migrant communities’ (including six that are actually born to Australia-born fathers).
I then calculate the mean income percentile rank and years of educational attainment for each
migrant community. The use of income ranks has a number of advantages. A well known problem
in the intergenerational mobility literature is the life-cycle bias that can arise if measuring child
incomes too early in their working life, and using it as a proxy for lifetime income (Haider and
Solon (2006)). In short, future high income earners experience faster income growth early in their
working life, and measuring mobility at this point may understate the degree of intergenerational
persistence. The second generation Australians I consider were aged anywhere from 25-54 at the
time of the 2016 Census, making this a potential concern. However, income ranks (as opposed
to levels) tend to settle down earlier in the lifecycle — for example, using Swedish administrative
data Nybom and Stuhler (2017) find rank-rank mobility measures are reasonably stable from age
in source country characteristics, and allowing communities to be studied from their emergence. It also eliminates
measurement error due to sampling variation that will result in a mismatch between those observed in the first
generation versus those observed in the second.
10Data from the full count 2016 Census was extracted using the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Census TableBuilder
product.
11The countries were chosen based on the size of the second generation population in the relevant cohorts and ability
to link from the 2016 Census back to 1976 Census. Some countries no longer exist as a single entity — for example,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
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30 onwards. Similarly, attenuation bias arising from measuring paternal income over too short a
window is also less of a concern when working with rank-based measures (Mazumder (2016)).
I calculate mean income percentile ranks as follows. First, individual income is reported in one
of 15 brackets. Using all Australian-born individuals in the birth cohort as a benchmark, I convert
these to fractile brackets. For example, if 10 per cent of the birth cohort are in the top income
bracket (total individual income of AUD156,000 or more), the fractile bracket spans from 0.90-1.00
with midpoint 0.95. For each cohort-origin cell, I then calculate the mean income rank by assigning
all those reporting income in a bracket to the corresponding fractile bracket’s midpoint, taking the
mean and multiplying by 100.
I extract educational attainment in one of the 41 categories, ranging from no education through
to a doctorate.12 I map these categories to years of education, creating a variable ranging from 0
through to 19 years, and once again calculate the mean for the migrant community. This mean is a
near-continuous measure of educational attainment, unlike the years of education for any individual,
which is necessarily discrete.
3.1.2 First generation sample, outcome and intergenerational links
I link cohort-origin cells of second-generation Australians to their first generation fathers in the 1976
through to the 2006 Censuses (the seven censuses where income is reported and the birth cohorts of
interest are still likely to be living at home). I do this by grouping men according to whether they
have Australia-born children in one of the six birth cohorts (c) and their country of birth (o).
I then calculate the mean income percentile rank and years of educational attainment for the
first generation fathers in each migrant community. To calculate income percentile ranks I again
consider individuals in the same birth cohort. The tabulations thus group men into five-year age
intervals, as well as by their country of birth and the birth cohorts of any Australia-born children.
I focus on men aged 35-39 and 40-44 years to measure income mid-career, but also at a point when
children are still likely to be living at home.13 I also consider men aged 45-49 and 50-54 years in
the 1976 Census to capture earlier birth cohorts, as the Censuses prior to this one did not collect
income information. Appendix Table B.2 shows in detail the child and father birth cohorts captured,
12Specifically, I use the 3-digit level of the ‘highest educational attainment’ variable that the Australian Bureau of
Statistics derives from individual responses.
13This limits the analysis to children whose fathers were aged 16-44 years at the time of their birth, given I only
capture children who are aged 0-19 years. This is not a problem for the analysis, as it includes the vast majority of
children — my analysis of Australian Bureau of Statistics data suggests over 95% of children will be captured (based
on paternity ages from 1975-1991 — data is not available prior to 1975) (Australian Bureau of Statistics (2017)).
7
and their corresponding ages at observation in the censuses. Income is again reported in brackets
through the seven censuses, with 12-16 brackets. Using all fathers in the same birth cohort (and
with Australia-born children who also share a birth cohort) as a benchmark, I again convert the
income brackets to fractile brackets. As before, I calculate the mean income rank for each migrant
community, though this time I have different means for each father birth cohort and census year. I
average these to give a single number for each cell. I first take simple averages for fathers observed
in multiple censuses — for example, those aged 35-39 in one census with a child aged [a,a+5], and
then aged 40-44 in the following census with a child aged [a+5,a+10]. I then take averages weighted
by the number of children, to produce the mean income percentile rank of the migrant community
for the first generation fathers.
Educational attainment is simply measured in the first census in which the child’s birth cohort
is captured. By placing no restrictions on the father’s age, I assume that educational attainment at
paternity is a reasonable proxy for lifetime educational attainment. I extract years of education as
a categorical variable, again ranging from no education to doctorate.14 I map these categories to
years of education, creating a variable ranging from 0 through to 19 years, and once again calculate
the mean for the migrant community.
3.2 Summary statistics and sample selection
As noted earlier, an advantage of the full count Census data is the ability to examine even small
migrant communities. However, the confidentialisation process applied by Australian Bureau of
Statistics when extracting the data will make particularly small cells unreliable. As such I restrict
attention to cohort-origin cells with more than 200 individuals in the second generation. This appears
to strike a reasonable balance between maintaining the ability to look at emergent communities, while
also minimising measurement error.
A potential concern in a pseudo-panel such as this is mismatch between the populations used to
calculate the first and second generations. Selective outmigration, family dissolution or measurement
errors could all lead to the first generation and second generation outcomes being observed for
different populations for each migrant community, and a resulting bias in the estimates. In Appendix
C I consider this issue in detail. The populations of second generation individuals captured as
14The classification was created by the Australian Bureau of Statistics to reflect the ‘highest educational attainment’
variable available in the 2016 Census.
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children in the historical censuses and as adults in the 2016 Census typically line up well, and I
exclude those migrant communities where there is a change of more than 30% in magnitude. In
Appendix C I show the key associations persist under alternative sample specifications.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the first and second generations of the migrant commu-
nities in the sample.15 Panel A presents the variation across all migrant communities by cohort
and origin, while Panel B presents the variation within migrant communities from the same origin,
by first subtracting the mean value of the variable in question for the origin. There is significant
variation in both cases. Migrant communities are slightly poorer than average in the first genera-
tion, with a mean income rank of 48.6, and slightly richer than average in the second generation,
with a mean income rank of 51.8. The size of migrant communities varies dramatically, with a 10th
percentile population of 300 and a 90th percentile population of 12,000. Importantly, Panels A and
B show there is substantial variation in the outcome variables and community size both between
and within source countries, allowing me to exploit the panel dimension of the data.
3.3 Individual-level intergenerational data
I provide further evidence of a role for culture and social context and explore specific transmission
mechanisms using two rich sources of microdata.
First, the Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth (LSAY). The LSAY program follows large,
nationally representative samples of students from their mid-teens through to their mid-20s. There
are six cohorts to date, beginning in 1995, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2015. This roughly captures
those born in 1980, 1983, 1988, 1991, 1994 and 2000 and hence lines up with the last three cohorts
explored in the census data (and beyond). The first waves includes test scores in reading and
mathematics and (often) educational aspirations, while later waves capture university entrance scores
and educational attainment.16 Own and parent country birth are also available. Finally, detailed
demographic information allow family background to be more precisely controlled for, and school
fixed effects to control for institutional setting.
Lastly, I use the Youth in Focus dataset. This dataset includes both administrative data and
survey responses and is based on a random sample of all those born between 1 October 1987 and 31
15I include only the true migrant communities, dropping the six observations for those born to Australia-born
fathers.
16Since 2003, the initial survey wave has been integrated with the OECD Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA).
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Table 1: Variation in outcomes across and within migrant communities
Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Panel A: Between migrant communities — raw data
First generation outcomes
Mean income rank 48.6 10.3 33.6 49.8 62.0
Mean education years 11.9 1.3 9.8 12.0 13.4
Number of children (’000) 4.8 10.1 0.3 1.1 12.0
Second generation outcomes
Mean income rank 51.8 3.9 47.8 51.3 57.2
Mean education years 14.0 0.6 13.3 13.9 14.8
Number of adults (’000) 4.5 8.7 0.3 1.1 12.1
Covariates
PISA outperformance 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.0 0.3
Income penalty 2.0 7.1 -5.9 1.1 12.7
Panel B: Within migrant communities — net of mean for country of origin
First generation outcomes
Mean income rank 0 3.5 -3.5 -0.2 4.6
Mean education years 0 0.4 -0.5 -0.0 0.5
Number of children (’000) 0 3.1 -1.3 0.0 1.5
Second generation outcomes
Mean income rank 0 1.5 -1.7 -0.0 1.7
Mean education years 0 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.3
Number of adults (’000) 0 2.7 -1.1 -0.0 1.5
Covariates
PISA outperformance 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income penalty 0 3.5 -4.2 0.1 3.6
N (distinct origin-cohort) 277
N (distinct origin) 63
Notes: Presents summary statistics for key outcome variables between and within the sample of migrant communities.
Migrant communities are defined by shared paternal country of birth and birth cohort. As described in the text, I drop
migrant communities with populations of less than 200 or with a discrepancy of more than 30% in the populations
observed in the historical censuses versus the 2016 Census. Panel A presents the statistics for the raw data, whereas
Panel B presents first subtracts the mean for the country of origin, to illustrate the variation over time in the sample.
March 1988, and appearing in the records of the Australian Government welfare agency (Centrelink)
between 1991 and July 2006. This dataset has own and parent country of birth, and parent edu-
cational attainment and income. It also asks parents and children about the importance of various
mechanisms for upward mobility — or ‘how people get ahead in life’.
3.4 Cultural and social context proxies
Finally, to investigate source country effects I use quantitative proxies linked to the characteristics
of interest. This takes the analysis beyond the ‘black box’ of simply examining source country
fixed effects, which facilitates thinking about both potential transmission mechanisms and omitted
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variables. It is also much more parsimonious, and in some cases allows variation over time to be
exploited.
As a proxy for the cultural value placed on education, I use country-level outperformance on
PISA tests in the country of origin. There is a strong relationship between PISA test scores and
national income (see Appendix Figure A.1). To avoid picking up these income effects, I first regress
combined average PISA test scores across science, reading and maths on log of gross national income
per capita and take the residual as my proxy — effectively the outperformance of the country on
these tests relative to other countries with a similar level of income.17 I do this for each year of
available data from 2000 to 2015, assigning to each country its average PISA outperformance. This
approach of looking at PISA performance given national income mirrors the exceptional educational
mobility I am seeking to explain among second generation migrants — their performance relative to
others with similar endowments.18
I use the income rank gap between the first generation and similarly educated natives as a measure
of the social context. To do this I use the 1% Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs) for the
1981-2006 Censuses.19 I first calculate the mean income rank for the native fathers at each level of
education. I then calculate the predicted first generation income rank for each migrant community
had they earned the same income ranks as the native fathers at each level of education. I subtract
this from the observed income rank to obtain the income penalty. The summary statistics are in
Table 1. Across all migrant communities the mean income penalty is 2 percentile rank points, that
is, an income rank 2 percentile points below a group of natives with the same education distribution.
There is a positive skew — higher income penalties are more common than negative penalties, as
few migrant communities earn higher returns than similar educated natives.
17I do not further control for national education spending or other factors that frequently enter cross-country
education production functions, due to both the proliferation of choices entailed in doing that, and the fact that these
factors will in many cases reflect the cultural value placed on education, which I am trying to capture.
18An alternative approach would be to use source country measures of the cultural values thought to matter. For
example, Figlio et al. (2016) find a measure of long-term orientation is associated with better third grade reading and
math scores, and larger test score gains over time, while Mendez and Zamarro (2018) report associations between
some non-cognitive skills and education, occupation and wage outcomes. However, the approach in this paper remains
agnostic on the question of which of many cultural values may matter.
19CURFs were only produced for the 1981 Census onwards.
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4 Model
I now describe the model I use to decompose the intergenerational income rank mobility of mi-
grant communities. The aim of this exercise is to better understand what drives the differences in
second generation outcomes across migrant communities. I begin with a group-level version of the
intergenerational income mobility regression:
y2,oc = αc + βcy1,oc + εoc (1)
where y2,oc and y1,oc are mean own and father income ranks for those born to fathers from origin
o and into birth cohort c. Both the intercept and slope are allowed to vary by birth cohort. The
residual εoc captures what I refer to as the ‘exceptional’ income mobility of each particular migrant
community — the extent to which second generation outcomes exceed those expected based on the
full suite of migrant communities. An analogous education mobility regression is:
e2,oc = ac + bce1,oc + ζoc (2)
where e2,oc and e1,oc are own and father years of education. In this case, ζoc captures the ‘exceptional’
education mobility of each particular migrant community. Income and education in both generations
can be related to one another via regressions of the form:
yg,oc,i = ρ
0
g,c + ρ
1
g,ceg,oc + ηg,oc (3)
where g ∈ {1, 2} indicates the generation. The resulting coefficients give the returns, in income
percentile rank points, to varying levels of education. The residuals ηg,oc capture the excess returns
experienced by individual migrant communities.
To understand what drives the exceptional income mobility of particular migrant communities,
it is helpful to express the residual from equation (1) in terms of underlying education mobility and
the returns to education captured in equations (2) and (3):
εoc =η2,oc + ρ
1
2cζoc −
bcρ
1
2c
ρ11c
η1,oc
+
[(
ρ02,c + ρ
1
2,c
(
ac + bc
y1,oc − ρ01,c
ρ11,c
))
− (αc + βcy1,oc)
] (4)
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This decomposition has an intuitive interpretation. A migrant community’s exceptional income
mobility is simply the sum of their excess return earned in the second generation (η2,oc), the return
to their exceptional education mobility (ρ12cζoc), the unwinding of their excess return in the first
generation (− bcρ12c
ρ11c
η1,oc) and a final bracketed term that is equal for all communities with the same
first generation income rank y1,oc. The final term simply reflects the difference in predicted second
generation income rank generated by either the income mobility relationship or the underlying
education mobility and return relationships. The first three terms capture distinct and commonly
hypothesised explanations for second generation success or otherwise — namely that the second
generation may earn particularly high or low returns in the labour market, get more or less education,
or simply appear to do better or worse because of the low or high returns earned by their parents.
In the formulation above, exceptional intergenerational mobility in income (εoc) and education
(ζoc), and excess returns to education (ηg,oc), are measured relative to expectations based on group-
level regressions estimating the underlying relationships across the full sample of migrant commu-
nities. An obvious extension is to measure exceptional mobility and returns relative to expectations
based on the native population — those born to Australian fathers. This allows for exceptional
mobility or returns to accrue to migrant communities as a whole. This is possible drawing the re-
turns to education from Census microdata and estimates of intergenerational income and education
mobility from the existing literature and the Household and Income Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) survey. The details of how I do this are in Appendix D.
5 Results
5.1 Decomposing residual income rank mobility
I now turn to the results. In this section I discuss the intergenerational income rank mobility of
Australian migrant communities. I then relate this to the underlying intergenerational mobility in
education, and the returns to education in the first and second generations.
Figure 1 shows the mean income ranks in the first and second generations for all migrant commu-
nities in the most recent birth cohort.20 There is clear intergenerational persistence in the outcomes
of Australian migrant communities — higher income ranks in the first generation are associated
20That is, for second generation Australians born between 1987 and 1991. The most recent birth cohort is chosen
to maximise the number of source countries plotted.
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Figure 1: Intergenerational income mobility for Australian migrant communities (1987-91 cohort)
Notes: Plots the average individual income rank of second generation Australians against that of their fathers, by
father source country. Circle sizes increase with cell population. Circles are labelled with ISO country codes, with
different colours for Asian countries and English-speaking countries. A short-dash line of-best fit is shown, based on
an unweighted regression. The cross marks the location of those born to Australian fathers, from which the shaded
region extrapolates, assuming a rank-rank correlation between 0.20-0.30.
with higher income ranks in the second generation. Regressing second generation on first generation
income rank yields the dashed line-of-best fit, with a rank-rank slope of 0.24. This is similar to
recent estimates of rank-rank mobility in the Australian population at large (Murray et al. (2018);
Deutscher (2018)).
There are also clear patterns in the outliers — some groups of source countries do better than
others. Asian source countries tend to outperform relative to other migrant communities. This in-
cludes countries where the first generation is above or well below the mean income rank (for example
Malaysia and Vietnam respectively), and of a range of different sizes. Conversely, Latin American
source countries often underperform. The English speaking countries also modestly underperform
other migrant communities but are, perhaps unsurprisingly, in line with expectations for the native
population.
Why then do we see these patterns of second generation success? The framework introduced
earlier suggests three potential explanations for a country performing particularly well. It could be
14
that the community in question outperforms in education mobility. Alternatively, it could be that
they earned a lower return on first generation education or a higher return on second generation
education. The same three mechanisms, working in the opposite direction, can explain a particularly
poor performance.
Figure 2 shows the underlying relationship between second and first generation education, and
the returns to education in each generation. While all graphs show a clear relationship, there
are equally clear outlying groups. For example, the Asian source countries are striking in their
exceptional educational mobility. The differences in the returns to education are, not surprisingly,
most pronounced in the first generation. Some source countries receive lower returns in only the first
generation (such as many Asian countries) while for others lower returns persist (Middle Eastern
countries). In Appendix Table B.3 I show the source country effects apparent in these charts tend to
persist, as most of the residual variation in the intergenerational income mobility, education mobility,
or return regressions can be explained with country fixed effects.21
21This can also be confirmed visually by replicating Figures 1 and 2 for the other five birth cohorts. Results available
on request.
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Figure 2: Intergenerational education mobility and returns to education for Australian migrant
communities (1987-91 cohort)
Notes: Plots: the average years of education of second generation Australians against that of their fathers, by father
source country (Education mobility); the average father income rank against average father years of education (Returns
to education (G1)); or the average individual income rank of second generation Australians against their average years
of education (Returns to education (G2)). Circles are labelled with ISO country codes, with different colours for Asian
countries and English-speaking countries. Short-dash lines-of-best fit are shown, based on unweighted regressions. The
cross marks the location of those born to Australian fathers in the same group-level dataset (Education mobility) or
in associated individual level data (Returns to Education). The long-dash lines present an indicative benchmark for
those born to Australian fathers based on the data presented or, as discussed in the text, the Household and Income
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey (Education mobility).
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Finally, in Figure 3 I explicitly decompose the residual intergenerational income mobility of
migrant communities using the approach outlined in Section 4. To simplify the presentation, I
collapse the decompositions to regional groupings, weighting each individual migrant community’s
decomposition by population size.22 Those born to Australian fathers are in the row shaded grey and
serve as a useful comparison group. There are a number of clear observations from the decomposition.
The exceptional mobility of the Asian source countries is predominantly due to their exceptional
education mobility. Relatively poor education is also the leading contributor to eight of the ten
communities with the poorest income mobility — the Middle Eastern and South American countries
the exceptions, where relatively poor second generation returns are more important.
Figure 3: Decomposition of exceptional income mobility
Notes: Decomposes residual intergenerational income mobility — the residual from a regression of average second
generation individual income rank on average father income rank — into four parts as in equation 4. The decompo-
sition consists of components attributable to: residual educational mobility (defined as for residual income mobility);
excess returns in first or the the second generations and a residual component. The decomposition is performed for
individual migrant communities, with the resulting decomposition then aggregated into regions (weighting according
to population size) to aid visualisation. The decompositions within the regional groupings are typically quite similar.
There are notable differences and similarities in the decomposition when exceptional mobility and
22I use the second level of the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Standard Australian Classification of Countries
(SACC) Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016). The SACC is essentially based on geographic proximity, grouping
neighbouring countries into progressively larger areas on the basis of similarity in terms of social, cultural, economic
and geopolitical characteristics. Some regional groupings (e.g. Central America) are not represented in the dataset.
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returns are measured relative to the native population. In Appendix Figure A.2 I present the same
decomposition based on reasonable lower and upper bounds on the income rank-rank correlation
for the underlying population. Exceptional education mobility remains the dominant contributor to
exceptional upward income mobility, but across all countries excess returns now play a more promi-
nent role as well. This reflects the fact that the deviations of migrant communities from underlying
native experiences tend to be less idiosyncratic and more of a shared migrant experience when it
comes to their labour market returns (compared to their intergenerational mobility). For example,
for Mainland SE Asia, the unwinding of below average returns received in the first generation con-
tributes around 3.4 percentile rank points to the exceptional mobility of the second generation. For
the United Kingdom, the unwinding of above average returns detracts around 1.4 percentile rank
points. These highlight two extremes of the migrant experience. The Mainland SE Asian countries
— Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam — have been sources of large refugee outflows.
It is not surprising that the first generation earned lower returns on their education than the native
population. In contrast, migration from the United Kingdom is more likely to be in response to
specific economic opportunities. Past research has hypothesised and found evidence that migrants
between similar countries may display “negative assimilation”, with their relative earnings declining
as the economic rents that may have prompted their migration dissipate (Chiswick and Miller (2011,
2012)). The results in this paper suggest an intergenerational variant of this negative assimilation,
whereby economic rents earned only by the first generation lead to reduced intergenerational income
mobility in the second generation.
5.2 The sources of residual educational mobility
Educational mobility plays a significant role in the income mobility of migrant communities. In
this section I explore a wide variety of possible explanations. Why is it that migrant communities
typically get more education than expected for natives? And why do migrant communities differ so
much among one another? To explore these questions, I add additional variables to an otherwise
standard intergenerational educational mobility regression:
e2,oc = a+ be1,oc + γXoc + δMo + ζoc (5)
18
where e2,oc and e1,oc are mean own and father years of education for those born to fathers from
origin o into birth cohort c. All specifications include an indicator variable Mo flagging the recent
migrant communities, those whose fathers were born in a country other than Australia. A range of
other covariates, corresponding to potential explanations for the educational mobility of migrants,
are in the matrix Xoc — these are discussed as they are introduced. I estimate robust standard
errors, clustered by country of origin.23
Table 2 presents the results. In column (1) I run the straight intergenerational educational
regression. The coefficient on first generation years of education of 0.32 is broadly similar to the
0.28 seen in the native population.24 The R2 for the regression is 0.47 — much of the variation in
second generation education between migrant communities is explained by first generation education
levels. On average, migrants end up with half a year more education than would be expected of
those born to similarly educated Australian fathers. In column (2) I add country of origin fixed
effects, which lifts the R2 to 0.87. The fact that so little variation remains indicates a high degree
of persistence in exceptional education mobility by country of origin.
What is it about particular migrant communities that explains these outcomes? In column (3) I
add the proxies for culture and the migration context to the initial specification in column (1). The
R2 now jumps up to 0.60, explaining around 24% of the residual variation from column (1). The
coefficients on both the culture and context proxies are both sizeable and statistically significant.
Being born to a father from a source country that is a full standard deviation higher in the PISA
outperformance measure — roughly the gap between Vietnam and New Zealand, or New Zealand
and Lebanon — is associated with an additional 0.5 years of education. Being born to a father from
a community facing an income penalty that is 10 percentile rank points higher — roughly the gap
between Vietnam and Greece, or Greece and England — is associated with an additional 0.3 years
of education.
In column (4) I explore explanations based on ethnic networks. For example, it may be beneficial
to be from a larger and more established migrant community (as suggested in Gang and Zimmermann
(2000)). I thus add the natural logarithm of migrant community size to the regression. There may
23In those specifications that include the PISA outperformance measure an additional concern is inconsistency in
the standard errors due to a failure to account for the presence of a generated regressor (Pagan (1984); Murphy and
Topel (1985)). However, bootstrapping standard errors to account for this did not change the conclusions in this or
subsequent sections.
24This need not have been the case, but may reflect a degree of balance between forces that would be expected to
lead to higher and lower persistence among migrant communities. It may also be that the factors that lead migrants
to do better or worse in the second generation than natives with similarly educated fathers are relatively uncorrelated
with their father’s years of education.
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also be human capital externalities, whereby individual education is influenced not just by their
paternal education, but the average paternal education of their community. This is the formulation
of ethnic capital originally introduced by Borjas (1992). For example, suppose the true individual-
level education mobility relationship is:
e2,i,oc = a˜+ b˜e1,i,oc + γ˜e1,oc (6)
where γ˜ is a human capital externality. Averaging this over individuals i within migrant communities
oc would yield a group-level relationship:
e2,oc = a˜+ (b˜+ γ˜)e1,oc (7)
Estimating γ˜ is straightforward in individual-level data, but ordinarily impossible in grouped data.
One potential test for the presence of such effects can be conducted if we assume that human
capital externalities are negligible (γ˜ ≈ 0) for some communities. For example, it seems far less
likely that the average paternal education of the first generation matters for second generation
migrants from English-speaking developed countries. Thus, I include the interaction of NESDCo
— an indicator variable for whether the origin is not an English-speaking developed country — with
average paternal education to see if it matters more for countries where human capital externalities
seem more plausible. There are, of course, a wide range of interpretations to a positive coefficient.
Peer, role model or network effects are all possible, but so to are mechanisms arising from statistical
discrimination or simply omitted variables. The results are at least consistent with modest human
capital externalities, with an increase of one year in the mean years of education of the fathers
associated with a 0.029 (s.e. 0.012) increase in child years of education. In contrast, the size of an
individual’s migrant community is not associated with second generation outcomes.25
In columns (5)-(7) I take the baseline specification from column (4) and add fixed effects at
increasingly fine geographic levels, from region through to country of origin. The association between
PISA outperformance and second generation educational attainment disappears — a fragility which
may indicate a weak or nonexistent causal relationship or simply reflect a lack of power. In contrast
the association between the income penalty and education remains significantly positive. Finally, in
column (8) I allow both the intercept and slope of the intergenerational education relationship to
25This is also true if included raw rather than log migrant community size.
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vary by cohort. The associations remain, and are only partially attenuated in the case of the income
penalty.
What might drive the association between our proxies for culture and social context and second
generation education? Further analysis is needed if we are to rule out some of the more obvious
omitted variable explanations, and read underlying causal mechanisms into these associations.
For the cultural proxy, it may be that migrants bring more than their culture with them to
Australia. For example, migrants may bring something of their origin country institutions with them
if they actively seek out schools and communities that reflect the environment they left behind. This
is a potential concern with the epidemiological approach — institutional and environmental factors
may be more portable than they appear. More generally, PISA outperformance may be correlated
with unobserved human capital that is not reflected in first generation education or income ranks.
More detailed family background and institutional controls are possible in the individual-level data.
For the social context proxy, a number of credible mechanisms may give rise to a positive as-
sociation between income penalty and second generation educational attainment. It may be that
first generation migrants who face larger income penalties are more likely to be motivated by al-
truistic concerns, and thus invest more in their children — a selection mechanism. Alternatively,
such migrants may come from countries where educational opportunities were limited, and hence the
parents posses and pass on to their children higher unobserved ability — a simple omitted variable.
Explicitly controlling for parental altruism or latent ability is not possible in the data. In both these
cases, however, we may expect to see this association emerging early in an individual’s schooling,
something I am able to test in the following section.
5.3 Individual-level data, validity and transmission mechanisms
Motivated by the above discussion, I now use test score and survey data to better control for omitted
variables and selection, explore transmission mechanisms. I begin with the Longitudinal Surveys of
Australian Youth (LSAY). I estimate individual-level regressions of the form:
yi,os = αsc + βXi + γZos + δMo + ηWo + εi,os (8)
where yi is an education outcome for individual i from school s, survey cohort c and born in Australia
to a father born in an origin country o. In Xi I include an individual’s: sex; age and its square;
22
and years of education and occupational scores for both parents. In Zos I include the mean years
of education for parents for all individuals in the same school s and born to fathers born in origin
country o. The controls in Zos may pick up peer or role model effects, but may also reflect own-parent
ability in the likely event that parent education and occupation are reported with some error. I also
allow for survey cohort and school fixed effects αsc. The variable Mo simply indicates those with
overseas born fathers, picking up a generic second generation effect. Finally, the key independent
variables, proxying for culture and context, are in Wo. Since the culture proxy varies only by origin,
I cluster standard errors by origin o.
I begin with a visual overview of the results. Figure 4 shows the association between PISA
outperformance, the income penalty, and normalised educational outcomes at various ages. Two
features are of note. First, the associations between PISA outperformance (‘culture’) and outcomes
falls with age, while the associations between the income penalty (‘context’) and outcomes rise.
Second, while the associations between PISA outperformance and outcomes falls when controlling
for ability, the associations between the income penalty and outcomes do not.
Detailed results are in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 I report the results where
the independent variables are standardised maths and reading scores in Year 9 respectively. The
coefficient on PISA outperformance is positive and strongly significant. The PISA outperformance
variable is calculated in such a way that a one unit increase is roughly equivalent to an increase of
one standard deviation on the PISA tests themselves. Thus individuals with fathers from countries
that outperform on PISA by one standard deviation, themselves outperform by around a third
of a standard deviation in maths and reading test scores at age 15 in Australia. In contrast the
associations between the income penalty and test scores are smaller and only statistically significant
for maths scores. In columns (3) and (4) I consider university entrance scores (a percentile rank) as
the dependent variable. Once again, PISA outperformance is strongly associated with higher scores.
However, a higher income penalty is now strongly positively associated with student achievement.
And whereas the coefficient on PISA outperformance more than halves once conditioning on Year 9
test scores, the coefficient on the income penalty rises. Finally, I consider educational attainment.
In this case, PISA outperformance loses its explanatory power, while the income penalty is strongly
associated with educational attainment, and again very little of the association is explained by test
scores.26
26The fact that second generation migrants from many source countries improve their relative performance through
their educational career has been noted previously (for example, by Marks (2010) in the Australian context). The
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Figure 4: Associations between PISA outperformance and income penalty and normalised educa-
tional outcomes at various ages
Notes: Presents the associations from Table 3 between PISA outperformance or the income penalty and education
outcomes, normalised here to have standard deviation one. The associations are simply the coefficients from individual-
level regressions of Year 9 math scores, reading scores, university entrance scores and years of education on both
variables and other covariates. These other covariates include an individual’s: sex; age and its square; years of
education and occupational scores for both parents; the mean years of education for parents for all individuals in the
same school born to fathers born in the same origin; an indicator for an overseas born father; and cohort and school
fixed effects. For the hollow dots, Year 9 math and reading scores are also included as covariates. Confidence intervals
are based on robust standard errors, accounting for clustering by paternal country of birth.
In Table 3 I use the survey weights to account for the heavy attrition between waves in which the
successive outcomes are measured. Nonetheless, it is plausible that the differences across outcomes
are driven by inadequacies in this method of controlling for selective attrition. Table B.4 largely puts
these concerns to rest. In columns (1) and (2) I replicate the specification from the same columns in
Table 3, but using the much smaller sample of individuals surveyed in Wave 10 and with non-missing
educational attainment. The coefficients on the key independent variables are broadly similar in size
and significance. In columns (3)-(6) I examine the years of education based on either the child’s
reporting in Wave 1 of their own plans or their parents’ plans for their education. Foreshadowing
the associations with eventual educational attainment, a higher income penalty is associated with
higher aspirations while PISA outperformance has no significant positive bearing on aspirations,
findings here tie that more closely to the context of migration.
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once controlling for test scores.
The joint analysis of school test scores, educational aspirations and attainment points to the
culture and context proxies operating through two different channels. The culture proxy — PISA
outperformance — is most strongly associated with achievement, and particularly conditional on
this, has relatively little bearing on educational attainment. It may be that the influence of source
country fades with time in the destination country, or that the cultural proxy used here isolates
beliefs and practices that matter more for educational achievement than attainment. In contrast,
the context proxy operates primarily through university entrance scores and educational attainment.
This is an important restriction. If the earlier association between income penalty and educational
attainment in the census data were driven by greater unobserved parental ability it would likely
show up in an association with test scores at much younger ages. Similarly, if it were driven by
greater parental altruism and consequently higher parental investments in children, that too might
be expected to show up by age 15. Instead, it seems the association is mostly driven by factors
that influence late educational achievement and attainment. The educational aspirations reported
in Table B.4 are one such factor.
As a final test of the robustness of the associations between the cultural proxy and scholastic
achievement, and the income penalty and educational attainment — I examine whether they persist
when considering variation within major source regions. In Table 4 I repeat the individual-level
regressions as specified in equation (8) with either the combined maths and reading score, or years
of education as the dependent variable. This time I also include dummy variables for migrant
paternal region of birth (Europe, Asia or Other) and the interactions of these with the culture
or context proxy. Comfortingly, the coefficients on the culture and context proxies remain jointly
significant and similar in magnitude when they are allowed to vary by region of origin. A visual
illustration of these associations is in Appendix Figure A.3.
5.4 Adolescent econometricans?
Why do some families aspire to more education than others? One answer may be that they anticipate,
rightly or wrongly, greater returns. As stressed by Manski (1993), adolescents attempting to estimate
the returns to education, and plan accordingly, face much the same problem as econometricians.
Past empirical work has indeed found expected returns to be influential in the schooling choices of
adolescents, including in the Australian context (Wilson et al. (2005); Roussel (2004)). The same is
26
Table 4: Influence on culture and context on outcomes, within paternal regions of origin
Achievement: Attainment:
Combined test score Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PISA outperformance (‘culture’) -0.21
(0.45)
X Europe 0.24∗ 0.21∗
(0.12) (0.12)
X Asia 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05)
X Other 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
Income penalty (‘context’) 0.00
(0.00)
X Europe 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
X Asia 0.06∗∗ 0.09
(0.02) (0.06)
X Other 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
p-value on test that culture (1) and (2) or context (3) and (4) proxies are:
jointly zero 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
jointly equal 1.00 0.93 0.32 0.71
R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
adj.R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
N 44,857 44,473 9,571 9,333
Notes: All specifications include: a quadratic in age; father and mother years of education and occupational scores;
mean peer father and mother years of education; school, cohort and region of origin fixed effects. The regressions in
columns (3) and (4) are restricted to those observed in Wave 10 and weighted using survey-supplied weights to adjust
for attrition. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, accounting for clustering by paternal country of
birth. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; and * p < 0.1.
true for parents considering the education of their children. Faced with the decisions and outcomes
of past generations, and potentially unable to observe ability, both parents and children try to infer
the return to education. It should be unsurprising that those confronted with different data may
reach different conclusions, just as econometricians do. This is a potential explanation for the results.
Migrant communities with low education levels and receiving higher income penalties in the first
generation may well infer higher returns to education than the population at large, and adjust their
aspirations accordingly.
I present tentative evidence for this channel using the Youth in Focus dataset. Beyond rich
demographic information, this dataset includes youth and parent assessments of the important of
various mechanisms for ‘getting ahead in life’. In almost all cases the surveyed parent was the youth’s
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natural mother, and I drop from the analysis the rare exceptions to this. The precise wording of the
questions to parents was as follows:
Now we have some questions about how people get ahead in life generally. For each
question, I would like you to tell me whether it is ‘extremely important’, ‘fairly important’,
‘not too important’, ‘does not matter at all’ or ‘undesirable, a bad thing’.
• In order to get ahead in life, how important is it to come from a wealthy family?
• To get ahead in life, how important is it to have well-educated parents?
• How important is it for a person to have a good education?
• How important is a person’s own ambition?
• How important is it for a person to have a job?
The same questions were asked of youth, with minor modifications. The ‘extremely important’
option was replaced by ‘very important’ and the ‘undesirable, a bad thing’ option was dropped,
and youth were not asked about the importance of coming from a wealthy family. Interesting raw
differences in responses to these questions have been noted in past research — Cobb-Clark and
Nguyen (2012) note that immigrant mothers from non-English speaking backgrounds rate both
own and paternal education as more important than immigrant mothers from English-speaking
backgrounds and Australian-born mothers. I take this analysis further by controlling for other
factors that may influence responses and examining how responses vary by more finely grained
source country characteristics (the cultural and contextual proxies). To analyse responses, I estimate
individual-level ordered logistic regressions of the form:
yi,o = α+ βXi + ηWo + εi,o (9)
where yi is the response given by an individual i born in Australia to a mother born in an origin
country o. Alternatively, it may be the response given by their mother. In Xi I include an individ-
ual’s: sex; years of education for both parents; maternal age and its square; and household earnings.
The variable Mo simply indicates those with overseas born mothers, picking up a generic second
generation effect. Finally, the key independent variables — the culture and context proxies — are
in Wo.
27
27I no longer cluster standard errors by origin o, as this results in smaller standard errors, perhaps reflecting the
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Table 5 presents the results for parent (Panel A) and child (Panel B) responses.28 For the
parents, there is only one association between the culture and context proxies and the perceived
importance of various factors to ‘getting ahead’ that is significant at the 5 per cent level. A higher
income penalty is associated with parents placing more importance on education. This finding is
tempered a little when looking at children, for whom a higher income penalty does not carry any
equally strong associations. Interestingly, however, both young women and their parents tend to
place more importance on an individual’s education. This could also be consistent with an income
penalty, in this case for a gender rather than a migrant community, influencing the perceived return
to education and flowing through to aspirations and attainment. In both Tables 3 and B.4, young
women aspire to and attain more years of education.
6 Conclusion
The size and salience of migrant communities in advanced economies makes their intergenerational
mobility an important issue — what drives second generation success or otherwise? This paper adds
to the large literature on second generation outcomes (Sweetman and van Ours (2015)). I exploit the
large, diverse and longstanding migrant population available in the Australian setting, and a suite
of data sources. I explore why some migrant communities do better or worse in second generation
outcomes than might be expected based on first generation outcomes.
I begin with a simple decomposition of exceptional intergenerational income mobility. This de-
composes the residual from a standard intergenerational income mobility regression into components
that include the contributions of: excess returns in the second generation; the unwinding of excess
returns in the first generation; and exceptional educational mobility.29 There is significant het-
erogeneity across migrant communities in both their exceptional income mobility and the relative
contributions of these factors — very different pictures of migrant mobility emerge across regions of
origin. Nonetheless, exceptional education mobility emerges as driving differences between migrant
communities, and explaining the striking upward mobility of Asian Australians.
relatively small number of clusters, including many with very small populations.
28I also present the mean responses, where a higher mean value indicates greater importance attached to a particular
characteristic. While all characteristics tend to be seen as having some importance, there are some notable differences.
Both parents and children place more importance on the characteristics of the individual than on family background.
Interestingly, on average, parents and children view an individual’s education as relatively less important than their
ambition or having a job.
29This decomposition, or variants, could readily be applied to individuals, families or other groups.
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Table 5: Perceived importance of various factors to ‘getting ahead’ regressed on explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Importance of parent... Importance of individual...
...wealth ...education ...education ...ambition ...job
Panel A: Parent responses
PISA outperformance (‘culture’) 0.64 0.42 -0.50 -0.41 -0.72
(0.48) (0.49) (0.56) (0.47) (0.52)
Income penalty (‘context’) -0.01 0.03 0.07∗∗ -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Migrant 0.14 0.25 -0.07 -0.30 -0.27
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22)
Female -0.03 0.07 0.30∗∗ 0.10 -0.11
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
N 1,166 1,171 1,170 1,173 1,173
Panel B: Child responses
PISA outperformance (‘culture’) 0.05 -0.10 -0.26 -0.23
(0.41) (0.43) (0.50) (0.42)
Income penalty (‘context’) -0.02 0.00 -0.05∗ -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Migrant 0.12 0.19 0.64∗∗ -0.20
(0.17) (0.18) (0.25) (0.18)
Female -0.17 0.32∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ -0.30∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
N 1,175 1,172 1,175 1,174
Notes: Results from individual-level ordered logistic regressions of the perceived importance of various factors to
getting ahead on culture and context proxies, and migrant and female dummies. Controls for maternal and paternal
years of education and log household earnings are also included in the regressions, coefficients available on request.
Naive standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** p < 0.01; **
p < 0.05; and * p < 0.1.
What then drives exceptional education mobility? I find some evidence for a role for culture using
an ‘epidemiological approach’ (Ferna´ndez (2011)). Second generation Australians from countries
that outperform on PISA end up with more education themselves. An even stronger relationship
emerges when looking at individual-level data on test scores in Australia that allow for much more
detailed controls for parental background, and the peer and school environment. This weighs against
a potential concern with the methodological approach — that migrants may bring not just their
‘culture’ with them when migrating to Australia, but also a tendency to choose institutions and
environments that mimic those in their origin. Lasting effects of culture on educational attainment
are, however, not apparent in the individual-level data.
I also find evidence that the context of migration matters, and indeed that it may matter more for
educational attainment than culture. Second generation Australians from migrant communities that
experience a higher income penalty in the first generation (relative to similarly educated natives)
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end up with more education, on average. This effect is apparent at an individual level in educational
aspirations and attainment — but not in test scores. In survey data, parents from these relatively
poorer communities view a person’s education as more important to ‘getting ahead’ than those
from richer communities. Young women — who also experience a much studied wage gap — and
their parents also place more importance on education. These findings would be consistent with an
immigrant family’s social context influencing the value they perceive in education, and hence their
educational aspirations and the attainment of their children.
This paper thus provides fresh evidence on the empirical importance of education to upward
mobility, and the potential roles of culture and social context in influencing educational outcomes.
Variations in culture and social context are not purely between migrant communities, and further
exploration of the way in which values placed on education, the value perceived in it and their
influence on educational achievement, aspirations and attainment would be well worthwhile.
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A Additional charts
Figure A.1: Relationship between PISA test scores and national income
Notes: Illustrates the relationship between the national mean PISA test scores, averaged across mathematics, reading
and science, and log of gross national income per capita, in purchasing power parity terms (current international
dollars). For countries observed more than once, the average values are plotted.
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Figure A.2: Decomposition of exceptional income mobility
Notes: Decomposes exceptional intergenerational income mobility — the residual from a regression of average second
generation individual income rank on average father income rank — into four parts as in equation 4. The decomposition
consists of components attributable to: exceptional educational mobility (defined as for exceptional income mobility);
excess returns in first or the second generations and a residual component. The decomposition is performed for
individual migrant communities defined by country of origin and birth cohort, with the resulting components then
aggregated into regions (weighting according to population size) to aid visualisation.
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Figure A.3: Associations between culture proxy and scholastic achievement (left) and context proxy
and educational attainment (right)
Notes: Plots the mean residuals from individual-level regressions of educational achievement and attainment against
the mean PISA outperformance (‘culture’) or income penalty (‘context’), where means are taken over paternal country
of birth. For the left panel the dependent variable is combined maths and reading test score at age 15, for the right
panel it is years of education. For both panels the independent variables include: a quadratic in age; father and mother
years of education and occupational scores; mean peer father and mother years of education; school and cohort fixed
effects. Countries of origin with more than 100 individuals in the data are labelled.
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B Additional tables
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Table B.1: List of countries, second generation population and first generation income (1987-91 birth
cohort)
Country ISO Alpha-3 Region Subregion Population First generation income rank
Australia AUS
Oceania And Antarctica
Australia 747,419 51.1
New Zealand NZL New Zealand 17,751 51.2
Papua New Guinea PNG Melanesia 1,471 53
Cook Islands COK
Polynesia
283 35.5
Fiji FJI 2,233 45.8
Tonga TON 1,269 28.8
Samoa WSM 966 29.4
England YLJ
North-West Europe
United Kingdom
46,654 53.5
Northern Ireland YNJ 765 55
Scotland YOJ 7,660 54.5
Wales YPJ 1,892 57.4
Ireland IRL Ireland 3,415 54.8
Austria AUT
Western Europe
858 52.7
Belgium BEL 268 46.9
Switzerland CHE 628 50.8
Germany DEU 5,044 48.6
France FRA 1,040 45.9
Netherlands NLD 4,574 48.8
Denmark DNK
Northern Europe
542 50.7
Finland FIN 547 47.3
Norway NOR 118 46.6
Sweden SWE 276 53.4
Spain ESP
Southern And Eastern Europe
Southern Europe
1,049 49.2
Italy ITA 13,500 44.6
Malta MLT 3,635 42.8
Portugal PRT 1,311 47.3
Albania ALB
South Eastern Europe
72 24.4
Bulgaria BGR 56 46.2
Cyprus CYP 1,863 40.4
Greece GRC 6,778 40.1
Romania ROU 776 32.9
Yugoslavia UDJ 8,882 41.6
Hungary HUN
Eastern Europe
1,056 45.4
Latvia LVA 57 93
Poland POL 2,536 44.1
Czechoslovakia UEJ 486 48.3
Ukraine UKR 151 52.8
Egypt EGY
North Africa And The Middle East
North Africa 2,572 47
Iran IRN
Middle East
911 40.2
Iraq IRQ 750 33.5
Israel ISR 461 51
Lebanon LBN 12,576 27.4
Syria SYR 858 28
Turkey TUR 3,667 30.8
Cambodia KHM
South-East Asia
Mainland South-East Asia
1,938 26
Laos LAO 883 31.4
Myanmar MMR 510 43.7
Thailand THA 346 44.2
Vietnam VNM 11,947 29.4
Indonesia IDN
Maritime South-East Asia
1,551 39.9
Malaysia MYS 4,468 57.9
Philippines PHL 3,118 49.3
Singapore SGP 1,322 53.5
China CHN
North-East Asia
Chinese Asia
3,787 34.2
Hong Kong HKG 2,598 49.8
Taiwan TWN 303 36
Japan JPN
Japan and the Koreas
417 57.3
South Korea KOR 1,050 40.7
Bangladesh BGD
Southern And Central Asia Southern Asia
173 49.7
India IND 4,002 55.2
Sri Lanka LKA 2,400 55.4
Pakistan PAK 561 44.7
Canada CAN
Americas
Northern America
1,335 58.8
United States of America USA 2,703 57.2
Argentina ARG
South America
632 45.8
Brazil BRA 176 46.1
Chile CHL 1,739 41.7
Colombia COL 161 39.4
Ecuador ECU 75 42.1
Peru PER 205 40.5
Uruguay URY 597 43.2
Kenya KEN
Sub-Saharan Africa Southern and East Africa
443 61.1
Mauritius MUS 1,305 48.4
South Africa ZAF 2,695 66.9
Zimbabwe ZWE 526 61.9
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Table B.2: Data structure — Census years and the ages of children and their fathers when father
education and income is observed
Child cohort Census year and ages of children and fathers
Father cohort
(age at birth) 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
1962-66 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1922-26 (40) 50-54
1927-31 (35) 45-49
1931-36 (30) 40-44
1937-41 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1942-46 (20) 35-39
1962-66 5-9 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1927-31 (40) 45-49
1932-36 (35) 40-44
1937-41 (30) 35-39 → 40-44
1942-46 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1947-51 (20) 35-39
1971-76 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1932-36 (40) 40-44
1947-41 (35) 35-39 → 40-44
1942-46 (30) 35-39 → 40-44
1947-51 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1952-56 (20) 35-39
1977-81 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1937-41 (40) 40-44
1942-46 (35) 35-39 → 40-44
1946-51 (30) 35-39 → 40-44
1952-56 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1957-61 (20) 35-39
1982-86 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1942-46 (40) 40-44
1947-51 (35) 35-39 → 40-44
1952-56 (30) 35-39 → 40-44
1956-61 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1962-66 (20) 35-39
1987-91 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19
All cohorts All
1947-51 (40) 40-44
1952-56 (35) 35-39 → 40-44
1957-61 (30) 35-39 → 40-44
1962-66 (25) 35-39 → 40-44
1967-71 (20) 35-39
Notes: Illustrates the census years and the ages of children and their fathers when father education and income is
observed. For each migrant community, the first generation education is taken from a single observation when the
second generation children are first recorded in the historical censuses. In contrast, first generation income is observed
when the father is 35-39 years old and/or 40-44 years, to minimise lifecycle bias. Observations at older ages are taken
to avoid missing earlier cohorts born to fathers otherwise too old to be captured.
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Table B.3: Persistence of source country effects
Mobility regressions Return regressions
Income Education Generation 1 Generation 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
G1 income rank 0.23 0.16
(0.04) (0.05)
G1 education (years) 0.31 0.19 6.52 5.47
(0.04) (0.06) (0.56) (0.79)
G2 education (years) 5.72 5.55
(0.42) (0.78)
Specification:
Country fixed effects X X X X
R2 0.39 0.87 0.57 0.95 0.74 0.96 0.74 0.91
adj.R2 0.36 0.83 0.55 0.93 0.73 0.94 0.72 0.88
N 283
Notes: Results from regressions of: second generation income rank on first generation income rank (intergenerational
income mobility, columns (1) and (2)); second generation educational attainment on first generation educational
attainment (intergenerational education mobility, columns (3) and (4)); first generation income rank on first generation
educational attainment (returns to education, columns (5) and (6)); and second generation income rank on second
generation educational attainment (returns to education, columns (7) and (8)). Slopes and intercepts are allowed to
vary by birth cohort across all specifications, with the marginal effect of the relevant regressor at means shown. Even
number columns include country of origin fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
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C Attrition and related concerns
This paper uses data from multiple censuses to create a pseudo-panel following migrant communities
across generations. In a true panel, selective attrition would be a concern. In a pseudo-panel
such as this, we might instead worry about selective mismatch between the populations used to
measure first and second generation outcomes. A mismatch between the first and second generation
populations could arise in a number of ways. For example, family dissolution may result in some
fathers being missed in the first generation, while outmigration may result in some children being
missed in the second generation.30 Reporting or processing errors could also result in individuals
being misclassified as first or second generation, which may be more common for those with low
English proficiency.
In Table B.5 I examine this mismatch. I show the percentage discrepancy between the second gen-
eration populations in the historical censuses in which either income (Panel A) or education (Panel
B) is observed and the 2016 Census. I show the mismatch for both those born to Australia-born
fathers, and its distribution for those born to overseas-born fathers. There is a moderate mismatch
between first generation income measurement populations and the 2016 Census for both those born
to Australia-born fathers and the median migrant community (Panel A), with higher populations in
the 2016 Census. This is more pronounced for the most recent birth cohorts. These facts are consis-
tent with family dissolution resulting in some fathers being missed in the first generation. There is
much less of a mismatch — less than 6% in absolute magnitude across all cohorts — between first
generation education measurement and the 2016 Census for those born to Australia-born fathers
and the median migrant community. This likely reflects the fact that while income is measured when
fathers are aged 35 years or older (to minimise lifecycle bias), education is measured at the earliest
point following the birth of their children. Thus families are more likely intact at the point at which
education is measured.
In Figures A.4 and A.5 I explore mismatch in a little more detail to motivate the baseline
30Outmigration is a common concern in the migrant assimilation literature (Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2015)), however
theory and past analysis suggests it may be less of a concern here. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) develop a theoretical
model of return migration that suggests it should vary negatively with migration costs, such as those associated with
distance, and positively with mean income in the source country. These predictions are then shown to hold true in
the United States data — outmigration is more common for migrants from nearby wealthy countries. Australia’s
distance from the rest of the world, particularly wealthy countries, suggests return migration should be uncommon.
And indeed it is — for example, Cobb-Clark and Stillman (2013) report outmigration rates between the 1996 and
2001 Censuses of less than 10% across 88 countries of origin, with a modal rate of just over 1%. Further, outmigration
only a problem if it results in us observing one generation but not the other — for example, fathers returning to their
source country without their children, or children returning without their fathers.
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Table B.5: Percentage growth in 2nd generation population between historical censuses and 2016
Census
Australia-born Overseas-born fathers
Birth cohort fathers p10 p50 p90 N
Panel A: Historical censuses used for 1st generation income
1966 8.6 -23.2 6.6 52.3 64.0
1971 8.4 -12.7 3.4 56.3 71.0
1976 8.1 -16.0 0.1 30.9 74.0
1981 10.7 -16.8 -1.7 20.5 74.0
1986 15.9 -10.5 6.2 26.1 74.0
1991 22.8 1.5 16.7 46.0 74.0
Pooled 12.4 -15.4 5.1 38.0 431.0
Panel B: Historical censuses used for 1st generation education
1966 0.0 -42.5 -3.2 61.9 66.0
1971 -2.6 -22.2 -4.8 30.4 69.0
1976 -4.3 -23.2 -5.8 28.6 73.0
1981 -1.0 -13.6 2.6 24.8 74.0
1986 2.1 -7.7 6.0 23.6 74.0
1991 3.6 -7.1 3.9 31.7 74.0
Pooled -0.4 -19.6 1.3 28.6 430.0
Notes: Shows the percentage growth in the 2nd generation population between the historical censuses and 2016
Census. The historical census populations are based on the number of children in the father’s household in the
censuses in which either income (Panel A) or education (Panel B) is measured. The growth is shown for those born
to Australia-born fathers, and its distribution is shown for those born to overseas-born fathers.
sample selection. In Figure A.4 I present a simple scatterplot of the second generation population as
observed in historical Censuses versus the 2016 Census. There is, unsurprisingly, a close relationship
between the two. However, this relationship is much weaker for the very small populations in
the the historical Censuses. This could be due to some first generation migrants being incorrectly
classified in the 2016 Census — if the second generation population is very small in a birth cohort
relative to the first generation then a small misclassification rate can still result in a large percentage
increase in the reported second generation. I take a conservative approach and restrict attention to
migrant communities with populations of more than 200 in both the historical and 2016 Censuses.
In Figure A.5 I present histograms showing the distribution of the growth between the historical and
2016 Censuses, for both income and education measurement. Few communities have large negative
growth, which would have been consistent with large second generation outmigration. In the baseline
analysis I allow for a mismatch of up to 30% in magnitude, excluding only the extreme tails of the
distribution.
The core associations examined in this paper persist under alternative sample restrictions. In
Table B.6 I replicate the specification in column (4) of Table 2. Restricting the sample to communities
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Figure A.4: 2nd generation population in the 2016 Census versus historical Censuses
Notes: For all second generation migrant communities defined by country of origin and intercensal birth cohort, plots
the population in the 2016 Census against that in the historical census in which the education of the first generation
fathers is observed.
with less mismatch between the generations increases the magnitude of the coefficients on PISA
outperformance and the income penalty. The difference in the coefficients may reflect an attenuation
bias introduced by the mismatch, but could also be driven by idiosyncratic differences between the
small samples.
Finally, it is also possible to examine the extent to which mismatches over a shorter time horizon
are selective given many birth cohorts are observed with their fathers in multiple historical Censuses.
In Table B.7 I examine changes from one historical census to the next in the population of second
generation children living with their fathers, and the outcomes of those fathers. I present this by the
age bracket of the child in the earlier of the two censuses. As expected, over the five year interval
between censuses, the population of children tends to fall — by an average of 5-10% for children
initially observed at 0-4 years, increasing to 20-25% for children initially observed at 10-14 years.
Again, this is consistent with family dissolution. The mean income rank and years of education of
the fathers also tends to fall, which is consistent with less advantaged fathers being less likely to
live with their children with time. But the fall in outcomes is very modest, averaging less than 3%.
47
Figure A.5: Histograms of % growth in 2nd generation population from historical Censuses to the
2016 Census
Notes: For all second generation migrant communities defined by country of origin and intercensal birth cohort, plots
the distribution of the percentage growth between the population in the historical census in which either income or
education is observed and that in the 2016 Census.
This provides more comfort that mismatch between the populations underlying the observed first
and second generation outcomes is unlikely to significantly bias the results.
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Table B.6: Explanations of exceptional educational mobility — varying sample restrictions
Minimum population 100 200
Maximum mismatch ±30% ±20% ±10% ±30% ±20% ±10%
Years of education (G1) 0.342∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.053) (0.065) (0.051) (0.057) (0.071)
PISA outperfomance (‘culture’) 0.506∗∗ 0.541∗∗ 0.685∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.682∗
(0.200) (0.213) (0.343) (0.206) (0.213) (0.343)
Income penalty (‘context’) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014)
Years of education (G1) 0.029∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.032∗∗
* NESDC (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Log community size -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 0.000
(0.041) (0.046) (0.064) (0.045) (0.049) (0.070)
Migrant 0.119 0.100 0.114 0.111 0.054 0.128
(0.181) (0.203) (0.307) (0.197) (0.215) (0.322)
R2 0.622 0.640 0.677 0.631 0.648 0.670
adj.R2 0.612 0.628 0.654 0.620 0.635 0.647
N 224 182 93 209 173 92
Notes: Results from group-level regressions of second generation mean years of education on first generation mean
years of education, with an indicator variable for those born to overseas born fathers, and controls for: culture
and context through the PISA outperformance and income penalty variables described in the text; ethnic network
effects, including the community size and allowing the return to first generation education to differ for those from
non-English speaking backgrounds. Robust standard errors are clustered at a country of origin level. Significance
levels are indicated as follows: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; and * p < 0.1.
Table B.7: Ratio of 2nd generation populations and 1st generation outcomes in consecutive censuses
Ratio of populations Ratio of outcomes
Cohort age in first census (years) Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Consecutive 1st generation income observations
0-4 0.945 0.094 1.014 0.072
5-9 0.933 0.090 0.997 0.071
10-14 0.836 0.097 0.988 0.074
Panel B: Consecutive 1st generation education observations
0-4 0.891 0.127 1.009 0.031
5-9 0.853 0.109 0.972 0.029
10-14 0.739 0.095 0.973 0.038
Notes: Presents the slippage in 2nd generation population totals and 1st generation outcomes when observing a
migrant community in two consecutive historical censuses, by the age of the 2nd generation in the first census.
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D Australian-born benchmarks for mobility and returns
This Appendix describes how I decompose the income mobility of migrants relative to natives, rather
than simply relative to other migrant communities. All that is required is to estimate, or assume
based on prior literature, the coefficients for equations (1)-(3), for the native population. The
exceptional mobility or excess returns for each migrant community is then the difference between
observed and predicted values, and the decomposition in equation (4) can be calculated.
Benchmarking to natives is relatively straightforward when it comes to the returns to education.
I am able to estimate individual level variants (or equivalents) of equation (3) for the first and
second generation of natives using data from the same Censuses. For the second generation I use
tabulations of income and education for the natives in each birth cohort in the 2016 Census, weighting
regressions by the number of natives with each level of education. For the first generation I use the
1% Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs) for the 1981-2006 Censuses.31
In contrast, it is not possible to estimate intergenerational relationships for natives in the Census
data, as the links are possible only at group level.32 Thus, for each birth cohort I only know the
mean income and education of both generations of natives — a single data point in each relationship.
I supplement this with estimates for the relevant slopes.
For educational mobility, I use the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
survey. The HILDA survey is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of Australian non-
remote private dwellings, with 16 waves of data currently available. Crucially, it asks respondents
for both their own educational attainment and (since Wave 5) that of their parents. I begin with
the full unbalanced panel and then restrict attention to individuals aged 25 or more and born in
Australia to Australian-born fathers. I take the most recent observation for each individual.33 The
selected sample does not fit those underlying any of the weights provided with the survey, so I instead
weight all individuals in a given sex, cohort and educational attainment cell so as to reproduce the
distribution of individuals across the same cells observed in the 2016 Census. I then estimate the
individual level equivalent of equation (2), again allowing cohort specific slopes and intercepts. The
results are in column (3) of Appendix Table B.8 (other columns present alternative specifications).
31CURFs were only produced for the 1981 Census onwards.
32The Australian Bureau of Statistics now has a program of linking individuals across Censuses, but the resulting
longitudinal file only captures those from the 2006 Census onwards. Further, the Australian Census has not asked for
state of birth in recent history, which rules out linking natives using the methodology in Aaronson and Mazumder
(2008).
33This minimises the extent to which we miss educational qualifications accrued latter in life. Parental education
is only asked for once, so this response is used for each individual.
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The slope coefficients are relatively similar across all cohorts, with a p-value of 0.35 on the test
that they are jointly equal to their average value of 0.28. I thus use 0.28 as the underlying slope
coefficient relating father and child educational attainment in the native population.
For the rank-rank relationship, I use a lower bound of 0.2 and an upper bound of 0.3. These
choices are motivated by recent estimates using both survey and comprehensive tax data. Using
HILDA survey data, Murray et al. (2018) find a rank-rank correlation of 0.27 for those born in 1984-
86, and aged 28-31 years at the time of measurement. Using tax data, Deutscher (2018) estimates
a rank-rank correlation of 0.17 for Australian born children in 1978-85, and aged 30 years at the
time of measurement. Finally, note that while the rank-rank correlation is less precisely estimated
than its educational equivalent, it is also less central to the decomposition in equation (4) — it
appears only in the second line, in a term that is equal for migrant communities with the same first
generation income. Hence the decomposition is less sensitive to this parameter, and in particular
the first three terms will remain unchanged.
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Table B.8: Education mobility for those born to Australia-born fathers
Coefficient on paternal years of education
Birth cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled 0.279 0.286
(0.011) (0.011)
1962-66 0.260 0.269 0.290 0.290
(0.013) (0.025) (0.014) (0.026)
1967-71 0.281 0.245 0.298 0.254
(0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.028)
1972-76 0.285 0.298 0.303 0.315
(0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.029)
1977-81 0.292 0.330 0.305 0.352
(0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028)
1982-86 0.277 0.256 0.286 0.260
(0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.027)
1987-91 0.268 0.267 0.272 0.289
(0.011) (0.029) (0.012) (0.028)
Specification:
Cohort varying slopes X X X X
Cohort varying intercepts X X
Weighted X X X
p-value on test of:
Slope(s) equal 0.28 0.905 0.005 0.353 0.613 0.000 0.133
Slope(s) equal 0.002 0.254 0.000 0.127
R2 0.093 0.095 0.096 0.093 0.096 0.097
N 6,643 6,643 6,643 6,643 6,643 6,643
Notes: Results from a regression of child years of education on father years of education for children and fathers both
born in Australia in the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The most recent
observation for all surveyed individuals is taken, provided they are 25 years or older at the time of the survey and
have non-missing responses to the relevant questions. Standard errors in parentheses.
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